Internet access, human rights and obliquity

I wish it were more broadly appreciated that respect for human rights has very positive economic benefits. Perhaps conservative thinkers would then shift from the default position of seeing them as an expensive indulgence. There are national security benefits too, but that’s for a different post.

Author and commentator John Kay argues against the inclusion of internet access as a human right (FT. com – registration required). This is in response to a BBC poll that finds 79% of the UK in favour. His objection is one of cost. In other words, he makes a mistake that many others do, namely that human rights mean that the state is obliged to pay for them.

Because John Kay is generally a quite reasonable chap with a refreshingly broad minded approach to economics, corporate strategy and so on, I responded at length on the site. I’ve copied that post below. The three fundamental points are:

  • Proponents of a right to internet access do not raise the issue of cost because costs are already quite low. They are at most a side issue to the issue of ensuring no-one’s internet access is blocked through badly written laws.
  • The language of human rights already includes the idea that a right to something does not mean the individual won’t have to pay for it. I give the example that the right to marriage does not mean the registration fee or the wedding itself will be paid for by government.
  • A deeper concern by government for human rights (e.g. taking basic needs such as housing seriously) would have economic benefits.

My response in full:While many excellent points of logic are made [in John Kay's piece], I think it entirely fails to address the issue in question. Which is remarkable, given that the concept of “universal service obligation” is raised.

That is precisely what the proponents of internet access are supporting. One does not have the water supply cut off as a consequence of breaching a hosepipe ban, or have the phone line cancelled as a result of a restraining order being taken out due to harassing phone calls. Petrol stations do not refuse service to those with points on their license. Many would say that driving without due care or attention is a rather more serious issue than not paying for a few movies, and therefore there is no justification for cancelling a modern day essential service due to copyright infringement.

That the cost is of no concern to the people proposing a right to internet access is a consequence of internet access being cheap and widely available. The concern is access being blocked due to minor infringements of the law; the cost of access is of negligible relevance to the issue and therefore does not arise. To raise it as a serious objection, as compared to a mere side note, is specious at best and deliberately obstructive at worst.

In short, if one agrees with the substance of an argument, it should be broadly supported rather than the specific language being used as basis for a lengthy diatribe that appears to be in opposition.

Moving on to human rights generally, again I think the fundamental point is missed entirely. It is utterly ridiculous to suggest that a refusal to torture is to deny that the potential victim is guilty and in possession of valuable information. Mr Kay should be fully aware that torture is an objectionable practice even with people known to be in possession of valuable information, if only for the practical objection that a torture victim will give false information simply to bring an end to the pain. The world has seen quite enough disastrous consequences at the hands of those dismissive of human rights, quite apart from the moral concerns.

More generally, the concept of human rights is entirely misunderstood. If we take the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a starting point, we would find for instance that under Article 25 that everyone has the right to a standard of living, including food, clothing and housing. Does the state have to provide these on demand? Absolutely not – the welfare state is only expected to provide a safety net of benefits. If the individual does not budget for, say, a winter coat then there is no obligation for one to be provided for them.

Article 26 states “Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.” By explicitly making the free provision part of the specific article, by implication all other rights may be seen through the “universal service obligation” lens mentioned previously. This must obviously be so, to take for instance the right to marriage as provided by the European Convention on Human Rights. The state is not obliged to provide a partner, pay the registration free or cover the costs of the wedding. A right to internet access is therefore easily to existing human rights without any of Mr Kay’s scare-mongering concerns about cost becoming relevant. It is arguably already a human right if one interprets various articles by the UN and EU conventions in any case.

Further, taking housing as an example, if government took human rights more seriously they might find that serious economic consequences of poor policy might be avoided. The housing shortage, whether through lack of social housing or from existing property owners blocking new developments, might at least have been alleviated by a deeper appreciation that housing is not simply desirable, or a form of personal investment, but a fundamental requirement of human existence.

In short, existing language of human rights already contains within it the idea of a “universal service obligation” where the despite the right, the costs are still to be borne by the individual. The cost-based argument as given ignores this basic concept, embedded in the major international agreements on rights. And as he argues himself, “misuse of the language of rights undermines the status of all rights.”

Of all the commentators I would expect to be more proactive in identifying the link between human rights and economic outcomes, it would be the author of a book called Obliquity. I would suggest to Mr Kay that he already provides all the intellectual groundwork to heartily endorse the right to internet access, subject only to a slight revision in the way he believes human rights relates to the allocation of costs.

2 Responses to Internet access, human rights and obliquity
  1. Oranjepan
    November 10, 2010 | 6:16 pm

    Keep writing (even if it’s irregularly), I’ll be reading.

    • Jon
      November 21, 2010 | 10:58 pm

      Nice feedback! Hurrah!

      Much appreciated, and will do.

Leave a Reply

Wanting to leave an <em>phasis on your comment?

Trackback URL http://www.contrastingsounds.com/2010/09/01/internet-access-human-rights-and-obliquity/trackback/